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INTRODUCTION
On May 23, 2013, President Obama delivered a major address on national
security in which he outlined the future of the military commissions. While
pledging to close Guantanamo, the President defended the "military justice sys-
tem" as a place to "bring terrorists to justice" in the war on terrorism.' Rather
than shutting down the military commissions, the Administration is bringing
new cases for the first time in years.' Obama's view of the military commissions,
dating back to 2009, is that there are "detainees who violate the laws of war and
therefore are best tried through military commissions."' Obama's paradigm for
charging detainees compels the question: what offenses constitute a violation of
the laws of war and can therefore be tried at the military commissions?
In 2010, the Obama Administration's Guantanamo Review Board estimated
that there were thirty-six individuals in Guantanamo who had violated the laws
of war and could be prosecuted.4 Until now, these individuals have been held
without charge under the law-of-war authority that permits the detention of en-
emy combatants for the duration of hostilities.
In 2012, the D.C. Circuit issued its seminal decision in Hamdan v. United
States (Harmdan II), holding that material support for terrorism-one of the most
common charges used in the commissions-was not a violation of the laws of
war.5 The D.C. Circuit therefore overturned Hamdan's conviction for material
support for terrorism, finding that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 author-
ized prosecutions only for conduct that violated the laws of war and occurred
after 2006.6 As most of the conduct for which the government seeks to convict
Afghan Guantanamo detainees occurred before 20o6, this ruling significantly
limits the scope of detainee prosecutions going forward. In Al-Bahlul v. United
States,7 the D.C. Circuit is poised to rule that conspiracy, another common
1. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2o13/o5/
23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
2. Jane Sutton, Guantanamo Prosecutors Charge Iraqi with Unlawful War Tactics,
REUTERS, June 10, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2o13/o6/11/us-usa
-guantanamo-idUSBRE95Ao3C2013o6n1.
3. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on National Security
(May 21, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president
-national-security-5-21- 09.
4. Final Report of the Guantanamo Review Task Force, DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL. 9-20
(2010), http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.
5. Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
6. Id. at 1248.
7. 82o F. Supp. 2d 1141 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc), conviction vacated and reh'g
granted, 2013 WL 297726 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam).
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charge, is also not a violation of the laws of war and likewise cannot be brought
against Guantanamo detainees. The Obama Administration has revised its esti-
mates in light of these cases and now claims that there are only around twenty
detainees who can be prosecuted.'
Thus, the government is left with a narrowing set of charges with which to
prosecute the detainees who were captured in Afghanistan. Consequently, there
has been increased interest in bringing charges of murder in violation of the law
of war and spying, both of which are rooted in the rationale that the Taliban fight
without uniforms. Given the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Hamdan II, these charges
now appear to be the most likely path forward for potential prosecutions of these
detainees in military commissions. The basic theory behind these charges is that
combatants who killed an American soldier while not wearing a uniform were
guilty of murder in violation of the law of war, and that those who conducted
reconnaissance while not wearing a uniform were guilty of spying. Congress in-
cluded these charges as triable offenses in the Military Commissions Act of 2oo69
and again in the Military Commissions Act of 2009.10 Both the Bush and Obama
Administrations have sought to prosecute fighters captured in Afghanistan who
engaged in operations against U.S. forces without wearing uniforms, but it is un-
clear whether these charges actually constitute violations of the laws of war. De-
pending on the scope of the forthcoming opinion in Al Bahlul, prosecutors may
find that they can no longer prosecute these charges. Problematically, because the
charges of murder in violation of the law of war and spying have not been the
subject of significant litigation, they have received little scrutiny." To date, no
scholar has analyzed whether these charges would be valid in the wake of Hamdan
II as violations of the international laws of war.
This Note argues that the government should refrain from bringing the
charges of murder in violation of the law of war and spying because they lack a
8. Carol Rosenberg, Prosecutor: Court Rulings Cuts Vision for Guantanamo War Crimes
Trials, MIAMI HERALD, June 16, 2013, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/o6/16/
3455042/prosecutor-court- ruling- cuts.html.
9. Military Commissions Act of 20o6 § 950(u).
io. Military Commissions Act of 2009 §§ 950t(17), 950t(27).
11. In contrast, much ink has been spilled on the international-law basis for material
support and conspiracy. For scholarship on the material support charge, see Major
Dana M. Hollywood, Redemption Deferred: Military Commissions in the War on
Terror and the Charge ofProviding Material Support for Terrorism, 36 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 1 (2013); and T. Jack Morse, Note, War Criminal or Just Plain Felon?
Whether Providing Material Support for Terrorism Violates the Laws of War and Is
Thus Punishable by Military Commission, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061 (2010). For
scholarship on the conspiracy charge, see Haridimos V. Thravalos, History,
Hamdan, and Happenstance: "Conspiracy by Two or More to Violate the Laws of War
by Destroying Life or Property in Aid of the Enemy," 3 HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. 223
(2012); and Stephen I. Vladeck, Terrorism and International Criminal Law After the
Military Commissions Acts, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 101 (2010).
467
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
substantial basis in international law. Rather, this Note contends that the Admin-
istration should transfer these detainees into an Article III court for prosecution,
where they can be tried for material support for terrorism and conspiracy. With
the impending withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the correspond-
ing loss of the international legal authority to hold combatants without charge,
the Administration soon might be forced to either prosecute these detainees or
release them." The clock is ticking.
This Note proceeds in five Parts. In Part I, we analyze the implications of the
expected 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan on the international legal authority
to detain individuals that were captured in conflict in Afghanistan. We argue that
after the withdrawal, the United States will no longer have authority to continue
law-of-war detention for combatants captured in Afghanistan. This will force the
Obama Administration to choose between prosecuting detainees in the military
commissions, prosecuting them in an Article III court, or releasing them. Part II
provides an overview of how the Administration prosecuted detainees caught in
Afghanistan in the military commissions by bringing charges of murder in viola-
tion of the laws of war. This Part demonstrates that both the Bush and Obama
Administrations have used this strategy. In Parts III and IV, the Note analyzes the
charges of murder in violation of the law of war and spying, respectively. In each
Part, the Note conducts an analysis based on Hamdan II to argue that the uni-
form-based crime is not a traditional violation of the laws of war. In addition, in
Part III, the Note cautions that bringing the charge of murder in violation of the
law of war might lead to retaliation against U.S. forces, making the charge a stra-
tegic liability. In Part V, the Note offers an alternative path forward, arguing that
the prosecutions should be conducted in Article III courts and provides a poten-
tial way to do so despite congressional restrictions.
I. EXPIRING POWER To DETAIN?
In 2014, the United States is set to withdraw most of its remaining troops
from Afghanistan. 3 With this withdrawal, the longest-running war in American
history will come to a close. While there has been much political commentary on
the changes this will herald, 4 there has been little analysis of the withdrawal's
12. Karen DeYoung, Afghan War's Approaching End Throws Legal Status of




13. Matthew Rosenberg, Impasse with Afghanistan Raises Prospect of Total U.S.
Withdrawal in 2014, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2ol3/10/o5/
world/asia/impasse-with-afghanistan-raises-prospect-of-total-us-withdrawal-in
-2014.html.
14. Such commentary has focused on the political future of Afghanistan, the continuing
relationship with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the likely implications for
counterterrorism operations in Pakistan. See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Afghanistan
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implications for the legal authority to imprison individuals who were captured
during the conflict in Afghanistan. In this Part, we argue that after the withdrawal
of troops, the war in Afghanistan, as conducted under the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force (AUMF), will be over. The corresponding domestic and
international authority to hold enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan un-
der the laws of war will also expire, thereby compelling the Administration to
choose between prosecuting these detainees in the military commissions, prose-
cuting them in Article III courts, or releasing them.
A. The End ofHostilities as the End of Detention Authority
The international legal authority to detain enemy combatants during war-
time turns in large part on the domestic determination that the Afghan war has
concluded. While several World War I and II cases suggest that certain war pow-
ers can outlast the end of hostilities, a close analysis of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld" and
Boumediene v. Bush"6 reveals that the reasoning underlying these decisions does
not extend to the power to detain combatants captured in Afghanistan. The with-
drawal of troops from Afghanistan will mark the legal end of the congressionally
authorized war, which in turn will terminate the government's power to detain
these individuals without charge under international law.
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. 7 was the most significant
World War I case on the termination of wartime powers. The case concerned the
War-Time Prohibition Act, which Congress passed on November 21, 1918, ten
days after the Allied Powers and Germany agreed to an armistice. The Act stipu-
lated that "until the conclusion of the present war and thereafter until the termi-
nation of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed
by the President of the United States . .. it shall be unlawful to sell for beverage
purposes any distilled spirits .... ' Kentucky Distilleries challenged the Act as
void because of the "changed circumstances" since its enactment-namely, the
end of the war emergency.'9 Yet the Court upheld the Act, establishing a distinc-
tion between the end of fighting and the legal end of the conflict. The Court
Troop Cuts Will Likely Lead to Taliban Surge, Study Warns, GUARDIAN, Feb. 20, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2o4/feb/20/afghanistan-troop-cuts-taliban
-surge-pentagon- study; Adam Entous & Julian E. Barnes, Frustrated by Karzai, U.S.
Shifts Afghanistan Exit Plans, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1o, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SBloo10424o5270230387450457937521146 9 3 6659 6; David E. Sanger & Eric
Schmitt, Afghanistan Exit Is Seen as Peril to CIA Drone Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2ol4/ol/27/worldlasia/afghanistan-exit-is-seen-as
-peril-to-drone-mission.html.
15. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
16. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
17. 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
18. Act of Nov. 21, 1918, ch. 212, 40 Stat. 1045, 1046.
19. 251 U.S. at 163.
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found that, by its own terms, the Act had not expired: "the period of war ...
extend[ed] to the ratification of the treaty of peace or the proclamation of
peace"-notably, past the time "when actual hostilities ceased."2 o
Following World War II, the Court built on this reasoning in Ludecke v. Wat-
kin." The case centered on the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, which allows the Presi-
dent to expel aliens from a particular nation "whenever there is a declared war
between the United States and [that] foreign nation."" In January 1946, more
than eight months after Germany had surrendered and dissolved as a sovereign
state, Kurt Ludecke was ordered removed and subsequently challenged the order.
Building on the Hamilton distinction, the Court upheld the order to remove Lu-
decke, arguing that "[wiar does not cease with a cease-fire order, and power to
be exercised by the President such as that conferred by the Act of 1789 is a process
which begins when war is declared but is not exhausted when the shooting
stops."2
Hamilton and Ludecke suggest that the powers derivative of the war power-
such as the authority to detain enemy combatants-might last beyond the end of
hostilities or actual fighting. If true, the government could continue holding de-
tainees under the laws of war even after the 2014 withdrawal of troops from Af-
ghanistan. Indeed, executive branch officials have alluded to this possibility.24 Yet
the Court's more recent opinions indicate a very different view of the implica-
tions of the withdrawal and end of hostilities in Afghanistan for detention au-
thority, which is substantially different from the kind of wartime authority in
question in Hamilton and Ludecke.
First, the Court expressed particular concern in Hamdi about the extension
of the power to detain enemy combatants.25 The oral argument for Hamdi fore-
shadowed this distinction, when Justice Souter raised the issue of the finiteness
of the AUMF more broadly. He stated that "it is a congressional responsibility,
and ultimately a constitutional right on [Hamdi's] part, for Congress to assess
20. Id. at 165-66.
21. 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
22. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006).
23. 335 U.S. at 167 (noting that "[t]he Court would be assuming the functions of the
political agencies of the Government to yield to the suggestion that the
unconditional surrender of Germany and the disintegration of the Nazi Reich have
left Germany without a government capable of negotiating a treaty of peace").
24. Jeh Johnson, The Conflict Against al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates: How Will It End?,
LAWFARE, Nov. 30, 2012, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2o12/n/jeh-johnson-speech
-at-the-oxford-union/ (" [W]e should look to conventional legal principles to
supply the answer, and . . . both our Nations faced similar challenging questions
after the cessation of hostilities in World War II, and our governments delayed the
release of some Nazi German prisoners of war.").
25. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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the situation and either pass a more specific continuing authorization or at least
to come up with the conclusion that its prior authorization was good enough." 2 6
This concern about the prospect of perpetual detention under the AUMF
ultimately was reflected in Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion. While holding
that the detention of enemy combatants is embedded in the authorization to use
force, Justice O'Connor found it troubling that "[ilf the Government does not
consider this unconventional war won for two generations ... then the position
it has taken throughout the litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi's detention
could last for the rest of his life."'2 While recognizing the "broad and malleable ...
national security underpinnings of the 'war on terror,"' the Court affirmed that
"[i]t is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no
longer than active hostilities."' Accordingly, the Court implied that the executive
may at some point lose its authority to detain under the AUMF, stating:
If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those
of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that
understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of
this date. Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently
are ongoing in Afghanistan. . . . If the record establishes that United
States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those
detentions are part of the exercise of "necessary and appropriate force,"
and therefore are authorized by the AUMF.29
Under this reasoning, the U.S. government's authority to detain will expire after
the 2014 troop withdrawal, after which point U.S. troops will no longer be en-
gaged in active combat against Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.
Boumediene v. Bush lends further credence to this analysis.3 o Observing that
the war on terror is "already among the longest wars in American history," the
Court hinted that it might need to impose limits on the executive branch's war
powers as the war drags on.3' Justice Kennedy's opinion stated that, "[bjecause
our Nation's past military conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been
possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers undefined. If, as some fear,
terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court
might not have this luxury."32 These two cases suggest that with the war in Af-
ghanistan finally winding down well after any of the Justices then expected, the
end of the conflict will trigger an analogous change in executive war powers, par-
ticularly with respect to detention, with the possibility for judicial review.
26. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Hamdi (No. 03-6696).
27. 542 U.S. at 520.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 521.
30. 553 U.S. 723 (20o8).
31. Id. at 771.
32. Id. at 797-98.
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While these recent cases appear at odds with the Court's earlier holdings in
Hamilton and Ludecke, a closer look reveals that they are not inconsistent; rather,
the current situation is different from those earlier instances in two significant
ways. First, the Court's rulings in Hamilton and Ludecke were grounded in the
specific and unique facts of the post-World War I and post-World War II peri-
ods. In the case of Ludecke, despite the ceasefire, the U.S. still had "armies abroad
exercising our war power and [had] made no peace terms with our allies not to
mention our enemies."33 Demobilization from the war was ongoing at the time
of litigation; the Court observed that "the railways are still under national control
by virtue of the war powers, that other war activities have not been brought to a
close."34 In contrast, after 2014, the bulk of U.S. troops will be withdrawn from
Afghanistan.5 Moreover, there will be no outstanding, still-to-be-negotiated
proclamation of peace or surrender-and given the nature of the enemy, it is
unlikely that we will ever arrive at this kind of end. More meaningful in this case
is the fact that we will withdraw having transferred full sovereignty and respon-
sibility for keeping the peace to the armed forces of Afghanistan.
Second, the earlier statutes were quite explicitly designed to address unique
problems created by the wars that continued to exist during the period of demo-
bilization-namely, the need to consolidate scarce resources and the risk of Ger-
man nationals conducting sabotage within the United States. This rationale was
reflected in a similar case following World War II, Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
which challenged the validity of a 1947 rent control law." In Woods, the Court
held that the war power could last longer than the end of hostilities to correct
problems caused by the war. In that case, the shortage of housing caused by re-
turning veterans.37 In contrast, the detention of enemy combatants is intrinsic to
hostilities. Therefore, the considerations that animate the authority to detain en-
emy combatants during wartime-namely, the desire to prevent them from re-
turning to the battlefield and taking up arms in opposition-expire with the end
of hostilities.
Given these differences, the Court's holdings in post-World War I and II
cases are distinguishable from the current situation. As indicated by the Hamdi
and Boumediene opinions, the end of hostilities in Afghanistan will likely mark
33. 335 U.S. 16o, 169(1948) (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 147
(1948)).
34. Id. at 170 (quoting Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146,
163 (1919)).
35. It is possible that a residual training force, likely under io,ooo soldiers, will remain,
but even this is currently uncertain. See Thom Shanker, Military Plans Reflect
Afghanistan Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2o14/
01/30/world/asia/us-and-nato-afghanistan.html.
36. 333 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1948).
37. Id. at 141 ("[T]he war power includes the power 'to remedy the evils which have
arisen from its rise and progress' and continues for the duration of that
emergency."(quoting Hamilton, 521 U.S. at 161)).
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the end of the executive's power to detain without charge, even if other war pow-
ers may outlast the end of the war. Accordingly, the authority to detain combat-
ants captured in Afghanistan under the international laws of war will expire after
the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2014.
B. Continuing Authority from the War on Terror?
A plausible counterargument to this analysis is that, even if the withdrawal
of troops from Afghanistan marks the end of that conflict, the government's legal
authority to indefinitely detain enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan will
endure because of the ongoing, broader war on terror. However, closer analysis
of the AUMF and the international laws of war on repatriation and co-belliger-
ency undermine this argument.
The 2001 AUMF states that the President shall have the power to "use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September ii, 2001." " Since 2001, the executive branch has inter-
preted this to authorize military force against "al-Qaeda, the Taliban and their
associated forces." 39 The Obama Administration has affirmed this view numer-
ous times, and has defined "associated forces" as "(1) an organized, armed group
that has entered the fight alongside al-Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with al-
Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners." 40
Based on this interpretation, the 2001 AUMF has provided the legal authority
for not only the war in Afghanistan, but also targeted killing operations in Yemen,
Somalia, and Pakistan.4 ' These operations have reflected a change in the nature
of the threat since 2001. While the al-Qaeda core has been "decimated,"42 offshoot
groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have grown increasingly active. In coming years, the
greatest risk of terrorism is likely to come from these smaller groups and other
similar entities that may evolve.
38. Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
39. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2o13/
05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
40. Johnson, supra note 24.
41. Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case To Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2ol/lo/o9/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo
-made-legal-case- to-kill-a-citizen.html.
42. Leon Panetta, Sec'y Def., The Fight Against Al Qaeda: Today and Tomorrow,
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Based on these circumstances, many argue that, even once the war in Af-
ghanistan is over, the broader war on terror will be ongoing by virtue of the tar-
geted killings that have increased over the years and likely will remain a critical
feature of U.S. counterterrorism policy.43 These operations are conducted against
"associated forces" of al-Qaeda and the Taliban; therefore, the conflict author-
ized by the AUMF has not concluded. And, accordingly, neither has the authority
to detain enemy combatants. By this reasoning, the government is permitted un-
der international law to detain combatants without charge as long as targeted
killings of "associated forces" are ongoing, which could be decades. Even predict-
ing the duration of such operations is highly uncertain, because the Pentagon has
classified the list of al-Qaeda affiliates considered "associated forces.""
Yet this argument has several critical weaknesses. While holding hostile
forces captive during wartime to prevent them from returning to the battlefield
and taking up arms is a well-established feature of war, holding them without
charge after the enemy in question has been defeated is unprecedented under
international law. In the context of the Afghanistan conflict, the enemy is essen-
tially the Taliban, and the conflict against the Taliban will soon be winding down
with the troop withdrawal. Article 118 of the Third Geneva Conventions provides
that "[p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the
cessation of active hostilities."45 Active hostilities in non-international armed
conflict are defined by the International Committee for the Red Cross as requir-
ing a "minimum level of intensity" against parties that possess organized armed
forces "under a certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain mil-
itary operations." 4 The offshoots of al-Qaeda are dispersed and decentralized
43. See Ken Dilanian & David S. Cloud, U.S. Seeks New Bases for Drones Targeting Al-
Qaeda in Pakistan, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/worldlasia/
la-fg-drone-bases-2o14o216,o,217o648.story#aXZZ2u9ykpggN; Abigail Hauslohner,
In Yemen, Questions and Anger Over U.S. Drone Targets After Civilian Deaths,WASH.
POST, Feb. 8, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/in-yemen
-questions-and-anger-over-us-drone-targets/2o14/o2/o7/ecbde2fe-8de2-11e3-99e7
-de22c4311986_story.html; Scott Shane, Targeted Killing Comes to Define War on
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/o8/world/
targeted-killing-comes-to-define-war-on-terror.html.
44. Cora Currier, Pentagon: Who We're at War with Is Classified, HUFFINGTON POST,
July 26, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2o13/o7/26/pentagon-war-classified
n_3659353.html.
45. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 118,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, http://www.icrc.org/applic/
ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=1F24DoC949FEB83C
12563CD0051B48C.
46. How Is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law?,
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 3 (Mar. 20o8), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf; see Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus at 8, al Odah v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-oi420 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 18, 2013),
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/o9/Al-Odah-petition-9-
18-13.pdf (noting that the International Commission of the Red Cross has noted that
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entities, with uncertain membership and leadership. Moreover, under customary
international law, because of their decentralized structure, these groups do not
constitute the kind of fighting force against which "war" can be waged despite
their similar branding.47 Though they certainly pose a genuine risk, the sporadic
measures that the United States' targeted operations have taken against them in
scattered geographic areas fail to constitute "active hostilities." Accordingly, the
kinds of targeted operations conducted against al-Qaeda's offshoot groups can-
not be considered a continuation of the Afghanistan war and therefore also can-
not trigger continued detention authority of combatants captured in that con-
flict.
Additionally, while the government has argued that AQAP and AQIM con-
stitute "associated forces,"' it is unclear whether other offshoot groups would
meet the criteria for co-belligerency.49 Though they may profess the same goals
as al-Qaeda, groups that have not actually coordinated with al-Qaeda against the
United States fail to qualify under the Administration's own test. Moreover, these
groups likely have no connection with the September ii attacks, with which the
original AUMF is concerned. As the al-Qaeda core in Afghanistan and Pakistan
comes closer to defeat, it will be increasingly difficult to demonstrate that off-
shoot groups are in fact fighting alongside it and can therefore be treated as "as-
sociated forces."
Thus, even as the threat of terrorism continues in the form of dispersed off-
shoots of al-Qaeda, the kinds of targeted killing operations that are likely to be
conducted in response will not constitute a continuation of active hostilities in
the Afghanistan context, which is required for continued detention of enemy
combatants. As a result, the government's authority to detain combatants cap-
tured in Afghanistan under the laws of war will expire with the expected end of
the war in 2014.
the maintenance of activities hostilities "requires combat operations at a certain
level of intensity against a force with a certain 'command structure' that has 'the
capacity to sustain military operations"'); Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of
Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 163 RCADI 147
(1979).
47. See Schindler, supra note 46.
48. See Charlie Savage, Obama Adviser Discusses Using Military on Terrorists, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2o11/o9/17/us/john-o-brennan-on
-use-of-military-force-against-al-qaeda.html (discussing the Obama Admin-
istration's position that the United States can "take action" against AQAP and Al-
Shabaab because they are "intent on attacking America" and therefore constitute
"associated forces").
49. See Jeh Johnson, National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama
Administration, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 141, 145 (2012).
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II. NON-UNIFORMED COMBATANTS IN THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS
When the authority to hold these detainees without charge expires after the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the Obama Administration will be
faced with a difficult choice: prosecute detainees or release them. Thus far, it has
opted to begin prosecuting these detainees in military commissions. However,
the commissions' convictions based on the charges of material support for ter-
rorism and conspiracy are likely to be overturned in light of the D.C. Circuit's
ruling in Hamdan II (and its likely forthcoming ruling in Al-Bahlul). Anticipating
this, the Administration has tried to find other charges to prosecute fighters cap-
tured in Afghanistan, and it has turned to murder in violation of the law of war
and spying-both of which are rooted in the opposing forces' lack of uniform."o
Before analyzing the legal basis for these charges in Parts III and IV, this Part
provides a brief overview of how the Bush and Obama Administrations have used
these charges in the military commissions thus far, highlighting the uniform-
based roots of these prosecutions.
The focus on the potential legal implication of the Taliban's lack of uniforms
began soon after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Speaking at Guantanamo Bay,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told reporters that, "I'm not a lawyer, but
there isn't any question in my mind but that [the Taliban] are not, they would
not rise to the standard of a prisoner of war" in part because they "did not wear
uniforms, they did not have insignia" in their fighting with American troops."
The Department of Justice issued a legal opinion during the Bush Administration
arguing in part that, because Taliban fighters lacked uniforms, they were not en-
titled to prisoner of war (POW) status and, therefore, were also not entitled to
the protections of the Geneva Conventions52 -thereby making all of their com-
batant acts violations of the laws of war.
In a memorandum entitled "The Status of Taliban Forces Under Article 4 of
the Third Geneva Convention of 1949," the Office of Legal Counsel relied heavily
on the lack of uniforms by Taliban fighters to contend that these forces did not
deserve protection under the Geneva Conventions. Assistant Attorney General
Jay Bybee argued that "there is no indication that the Taliban military wore any
distinctive uniform or other insignia" and that "the Taliban wore the same
clothes they wore to perform other daily functions, and hence they would have
50. Observers widely expect the government to lose in the case. See, e.g., Rafaella
Wakeman & Wells Bennett, Al-Bahlul v. United States: Oral Argument Recap,
LAWFARE (Sep 30, 2013, 9:09 PM) (discussing the "widely-shared view[ that] the
question probably isn't whether the government is going to lose its appeal to the full
circuit court," but rather "how it will lose").
51. Donald Rumsfeld, Media Availability En Route to Camp X-Ray (Jan. 27, 2002),
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2338.
52. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, White
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been indistinguishable from civilians."" Jack Goldsmith later recounted in his
book The Terror Presidency that President Bush had "embraced the traditional
American view that the Geneva Conventions did not give POW protections to
combatants who fought out of uniform and failed to comply with the laws of
war,"54 a view he emphatically disputed. Ari Fleischer, the White House press
secretary from 2001 to 2003, summarized the Administration's position similarly:
"They [the Nazis] followed the law of war. They wore uniforms and they fought
us on battlefields. These people [terrorists] are fundamentally, totally by design
different. And they need to be treated in a different extrajudicial system.""
Though many of the lawyers within the Judge Advocate Corps rejected these
arguments, this aggressive interpretation of the status of prisoners in Afghanistan
nonetheless remained firmly in place. Even as the Bush Administration came un-
der criticism, the State Department defended the legal position because the Tali-
ban "do not have a fixed distinctive sign" and they are "promoting barbaric phi-
losophies" in their combat." It was based on this line of reasoning that
administration officials concluded that captured fighters in Afghanistan could be
held as unlawful enemy combatants.
The government began charging captured Taliban combatants in military
commissions for uniform-based offenses, such as murder in violation of the law
of war and spying. The most famous such case was that of Omar Khadr. A 15-
year-old Canadian, Khadr was captured in Afghanistan in 2002 after throwing a
grenade at an American soldier and killing him.57 After transferring him to Guan-
tdinamo, the United States began preparing to prosecute him in newly created
53. Id.
54. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 115 (2007).
55. Ben Armbruster, Former Bush Official Praises Nazis' Respect for Laws of War in
Dejending Gitmo, THINKPROGRESS (May 3, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://thinkprogress
.org/security/2013/05/03/1960261/fleischer-nazis-gitmo.
56. Pierre-Richard Propser, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Status and
Treatment of Taliban and al-Qaida Detainees, Remarks at Chatham House (Feb.
20, 2002) ("[A] careful analysis through the lens of the Geneva Convention leads us
to the conclusion that the Taliban detainees do not meet the legal criteria under
Article 4 of the convention which would have entitled them to POW status. They
are not under a responsible command. They do not conduct their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war. They do not have a fixed distinctive
sign recognizable from a distance. And they do not carry their arms openly. Their
conduct and history of attacking civilian populations, disregarding human life and
conventional norms, and promoting barbaric philosophies represents firm proof of
their denied status.").
57. Charlie Savage, Delays Keep Former Qaeda Child Soldier at Guantdnamo, Despite
Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/o3/25/us/
delays-keep-omar-khadr-at-guantanamo-despite-plea-deal.html.
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military commissions. In response to the Court's ruling in Hamdi," the govern-
ment charged him in 2005 with murder in violation of the laws of war on the
grounds that Khadr was wearing plainclothes at the time of the grenade attack. 9
The charge sheet elaborated that Khadr's actions had been conducted "without
enjoying combatant immunity" due to his lack of uniform.6 o On the same theory,
and as will be discussed below in Part IV, the United States later charged him
with spying for his observations of U.S. troops.6 After years of legal battles, Khadr
pleaded guilty to these and other charges in 2oo; he remains in a Canadian prison
today.
The Obama Administration, largely continuing the Bush Administration's
prosecution strategy, carefully preserved the possibility of bringing charges
against Afghan captives who had engaged in hostilities without uniforms. During
the 2009 reformation of the Military Commissions Act, the Obama Administra-
tion lobbied Congress as it was drafting the new statute to ensure that murder in
violation of the law of war and spying remained triable by military commission.
The Act specifies that murder in violation of the law of war occurs when a com-
batant "intentionally kills one or more persons, including privileged belligerents,
in violation of the law of war"-for instance, if the individual commits such a
killing while not wearing a uniform-and that such a violation can be tried in the
military commissions." Spying is similarly defined as occurring when a combat-
ant tries to "collect information by clandestine means or while acting under false
pretenses" in order to gain information that would be harmful to the United
States. 64
Moreover, the Administration defended the conviction of Omar Khadr for
spying and murder in violation of the law of war on appeal.6 5 Even in the ongoing
58. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
59. Charlie Savage, Deal Averts Trial in Disputed Guantinamo Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2o1o/10/26/us/26gitmo.html.
60. Charge Sheet, United States v. Khadr, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www.defense.gov/
news/d2007khadr%2o-%2onotification%200f%2Osworn%2ocharges.pdf [hereinafter
Khadr Charge Sheet].
61. Stipulation of Fact, United States v. Khadr, Oct. 13, 2010, http://media
.miamiherald.com/smedia/2010/10/26/19/stip2.source.prod-affiliate.56.pdf.
62. Ian Austen, Sole Canadian Held at Guantinamo Bay Is Repatriated, N.Y.TIMES, Sept.
29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/3o/world/americas/canadian-held-at
-guantanamo-bay-is-repatriated.html.
63. Military Commissions Act of 2009 § 950t(15), 10 U.S.C. § 1802 (2012).
64. Id. § 950t(27).
65. Scott Horton, The Khadr Boomerang, HARPER'S MAG. (Mar. 25, 2010)
http://harpers.org/blog/2010/05/the-khadr-boomerang/ (discussing the Obama
Administration's internal disputes over the Khadr case and the decision to
ultimately defend the conviction).
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litigation in Al-Bahlul, the Obama Administration has made clear that it consid-
ers spying a prosecutable offense in the commissions; the government's brief
maintained that "spying has been an offense punishable by military tribunal."16
In the following two Parts, we analyze the charges of murder in violation of the
law of war and spying under international law in order to assess the validity of
the Bush and Obama Administration's efforts to prosecute detainees in the mili-
tary commissions using these uniform-based offenses.
III. MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR
In forthcoming cases at the military commissions, the government will have
to consider whether to continue to try fighters captured in Afghanistan for mur-
der in violation of the law of war. Though fighting, and occasionally killing, is an
inherent element of war, the charge of murder in violation of the law of war is
premised on the idea that Taliban fighters not wearing uniforms were not entitled
to attack U.S. soldiers and can be held criminally responsible for doing so.
The Military Commissions Act has designated "murder in violation of the
law of war" as a triable offense and the government has sought to bring charges
against various individuals for attacks in Afghanistan in which they accuse the
defendant of violating the laws of war.
In this Part, we argue that this charge is untenable under the international
laws of war and therefore fails the Hamdan II standard for being a violation of
the laws of war before 20o6. Moreover, continuing to bring the charge would be
a strategic mistake for the United States, because it could invite retaliation against
U.S. soldiers and intelligence operatives who frequently fight without a uniform.
We contend that murder in violation of the law of war should not be used for
further prosecutions against detainees captured in Afghanistan and currently
held in indefinite detention.
A. Criminalizing Combat Without a Uniform
The United States has sought to criminalize by statute the direct participa-
tion in hostilities by combatants not wearing a uniform throughout the war in
Afghanistan.6 7 These charges have evolved from "murder by an unprivileged bel-
ligerent" to "murder in violation of the law of war" as the statutory framework
has developed, but the underlying conduct at issue has remained rooted in the
belief that not wearing a uniform disqualifies belligerents from combatant im-
munity. The November 13, 20ol Executive Order that originally established the
66. Brief for Respondent at 29, Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. July io,
2013).
67. David Frakt, Direct Participation in Hostilities as a War Crime: America's Failed
Efforts to Change the Law of War, 46 VALPARAISO L. REV. 729, 734 (2012).
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military commissions specified that a charge of "murder by an unprivileged bel-
ligerent" could apply to any fighter who did not "enjoy combatant immunity."
The Military Commissions Act of 2oo6 adopted a similar approach, but updated
the charge to "murder in violation of the law of war."'9 The regulation imple-
menting the charge specified that in order to be tried for the offense, "the accused
must have taken acts as a combatant without having met the requirements for
lawful combatancy."7 o Congress preserved this charge, despite making many
other reforms in the Military Commissions Act of 2009, stating that if someone
"other than a privileged belligerent" has "engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners," that person can be tried for a violation of the laws
of war.71 Department of Defense interpretations of this provision clarified that
"[e]ven an attack on a soldier would be a crime if the attacker did not enjoy 'bel-
ligerent privilege' or 'combatant immunity."'7
Drawing on this statutory framework, the U.S. government has used these
charges to prosecute a number of the cases involving Guantdnamo detainees. As
discussed earlier, Omar Khadr was charged for murder in violation of the laws of
war in 2002 because he was not wearing a uniform when he threw a grenade at
U.S. soldiers.73 Khadr's case drew attention to the implications for enemy com-
batants who failed to wear a uniform, but several other commissions convictions
stemmed from this charge. As a result, he conducted the attack, the charge sheet
argued, "without enjoying combatant immunity."74
In another series of cases, the United States government charged individuals
who fought in Afghanistan as non-privileged belligerents because they were not
part of a recognized military. Mohammad Jawad, an Afghan citizen who threw a
hand-grenade at U.S. soldiers in Kabul in December 2002,75 faced similar charges
based on attempt liability.76 David Hicks, an Australian captured at an al-Qaeda
training camp in Afghanistan, also was prosecuted for participating in hostilities
against U.S. soldiers without the protections of a privileged belligerent." Salim
Hamdan, who served as Osama Bin Laden's driver and aide in Afghanistan78 was
68. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
69. Military Commissions Act of 20o6, 10 U.S.C. § 950v(15) (2006).
70. Frakt, supra note 67, at 738.
71. Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(3) (2012).
72. 32 C.F.R. § 11.6(b)( 3)(ii)(B) (2005).
73. Savage, supra note 59.
74. Khadr Charge Sheet, supra note 60.
75. Frakt, supra note 67, at 745.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 742.
78. Id. at 743.
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convicted in part because he "[tiransported weapons or weapons systems . .. to
Taliban or al Qaeda members and associates" while he lacked the protected status
of a privileged combatant.79 While Khadr's case became the most prominent in
drawing attention to the implications for enemy combatants who failed to wear
a uniform, all of the charges listed above were in fact rooted in this issue.
These prosecutions were part of a general effort by the Bush Administration
to take away the protected status of individuals who directly participated in hos-
tilities without donning a uniform, thereby making all of their conduct criminal.
David Frakt, defense counsel for Omar Khadr, summarized these charges in con-
gressional testimony: "In other words, the mere status of being an unlawful com-
batant . .. converted any act of fighting, any act of attempt to kill U.S. soldiers,
into a war crime."so In the cases above, the military commissions' defense counsel
continually challenged the Bush Administration's theory that any actions taken
by Taliban fighters lacking uniforms were inherently violations of international
law, to little avail.
B. The Hamdan II Test and International Law
The charge of murder in violation of the law of war lacks a basis in interna-
tional law and thus fails the Hamdan II test. Since Hamdan II came down, the
military commissions have not considered a case of murder in violation of the
law of war. The government's claim that participating in an armed conflict with-
out a uniform is a punishable offense is rooted in the historic ability of states to
convict those who fought against them using irregular tactics, such as guerrilla
warfare. However, as resistance movements became increasingly regarded as le-
gitimate over the twentieth century-triggering a corresponding change in atti-
tudes toward irregular tactics-that dynamic has dramatically changed. Under
the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention, a central development in in-
ternational law of war, the lack of uniform is not considered a violation of the
law of war. In this Part, we trace the development of how international law has
treated combatants who lack a uniform. We also demonstrate why the lack of
uniform is only a violation of the law of war if it is utilized in the context of an
"underlying direct participation" in a war crime such as killing civilians."'
The historical disregard for guerrilla warfare extends back to the interna-
tional law scholars of antiquity, who sought to abolish it. Early international ju-
rists such as Ayala, Grotius, Gentili, and Pufendorf agreed that guerilla fighters
should be "considered to be the common enemy of all," in the same way that
79. Id.
8o. Id. at 749.
81. Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by
Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 511, 520-21 (2005).
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pirates were the enemy of all mankind."2 In this vein of thinking, "[r]esistance
warfare carried out by civilians was considered illegal; partisan fighters were es-
sentially bandits who were not entitled to any form of protection or recognition
under the laws and customs of war at that time."3 This consensus around disap-
proval of guerilla activities gave rise to a legal framework that did not recognize
the right of guerilla fighters to wage war.
Political theorists in the nineteenth century supported this position. Henry
Wheaton argued in 1836 that "regular bands of marauders are liable to be treated
as lawless bandits, not entitled to the protection of the mitigated usages of war as
practiced by civilised nation[s]."8 4 Henry Halleck took a similar view in his ca-
nonical 1861 work International Law. He noted that "in modern warfare, partisan
and guerilla bands, such as we have here described, are regarded as outlaws, and,
when captured, may be punished the same as free-booters and banditti."5 Ac-
cording to Halleck, a killing conducted by a guerilla fighter who was not wearing
a uniform was the same as murder. This understanding of the legitimacy of guer-
rilla activity cohered during a period in which the nature of warfare took a very
particular form-generally, massive state armies, clad in national insignia, facing
off against each other." Accordingly, the Lieber Code, the first major attempt to
codify the laws of war, only extended combatant protections to regular soldiers,
not irregular fighters8 7
In line with this view, the U.S. military courts after World War II acquitted
German generals charged with executing guerillas in the "Hostages Trial." Dur-
ing the Balkans campaign, the Germans shot prisoners who were captured while
fighting for the resistance forces. 8 The commanding officers were charged at the
military courts for both the murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and
82. Donald E. Hacker, The Application of Prisoner-of- War Status to Guerillas Under the
First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 2 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 131, 134 (1978).
83. Emily Crawford, Regulating the Irregular: International Humanitarian Law and the
Question of Civilian Participation in Armed Conflicts, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 164, 168
(2011).
84. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 473 (Richard Henry Dana, Jr.
ed., 8th ed. 1866).
85. HENRY HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF
STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 387 (1861).
86. Id. at 386-87.
87. General Orders No. ioo: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field (Lieber Code), promulgated Apr. 24, 1863,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/i9th-century/lieber.asp.
88. JOSO TOMASEVICH, WAR AND REVOLUTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1941-1945: OCCUPATION
AND COLLABORATION 93 (2001).
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arbitrarily designating combatants as "partisans," thereby denying them the sta-
tus of prisoners of war.9 The case directly raised the question of whether the
"partisans" were entitled to the protections of the laws of war. If they were, their
treatment and killing would likely constitute a war crime. Yet the courts looked
to the civilian clothing generally worn by the resistance fighters and ruled that
they were not legitimate combatants and therefore could be executed without
violating the laws of war. The court stated that the partisans "were not shown by
satisfactory evidence to have met the requirements" for being lawful belligerents;
they "had no common uniform" and "[nleither did they carry their arms openly
except when it was to their advantage to do so."9o From these facts, the court
concluded that, "captured members of these unlawful groups were not entitled
to be treated as prisoners of war. No crime can be properly charged against the
defendants for the killing of such captured members of the resistance forces, they
being franc-tireurs."9 '
In the Hostages Trial, the Court relied on Prussia's decision to execute the
Francs- Tireurs, French guerilla fighters, as precedent. During the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, major powers sought to delegitimize resistance move-
ments that challenged their rule. In fact, throughout history, stemming from sim-
ilar strategic considerations, it has generally been the case that "major military
powers have argued that only regular, uniformed and disciplined combatants
who distinguish themselves clearly from the civilian population should have the
right to participate directly in hostilities."9' The Franco-Prussian War illustrates
this tendency, when the German hostility toward guerilla tactics was motivated
in large part by a desire to suppress a French rebellion that was disadvantageous
to the German campaign.3 Prussia executed the Francs-Tireurs for engaging in
hostilities without a uniform. 94
The Hostages Trial built on the treatment of the Francs-Tireurs and, in turn,
it has been cited over the past decade by those defending the U.S. government's
89. The Hostages Trial: Trial of Wilhelm List and Others (Case No. 47), 8 L. RPTs. OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 35-36 (U.N. War Crimes Comm. 1948).
90. Id. at 57 (internal citations omitted).
91. Id.
92. Waldemar A. Solf, A Response to Douglas ]. Feith's Law in the Service of Terror-
The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol, 20 AKRON L. REV. 261, 269 (1986).
93. John Horne, Defining the Enemy: War, Law, and the Leve en Masse from 187o to 1945,
in THE PEOPLE IN ARMS, MILITARY MYTH AND NATIONAL MOBILIZATION SINCE THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 100, lo8-10 (Daniel Moran & Arthur Waldron eds., 2003).
94. Evan J. Wallach, Partisans, Pirates, and Pancho Villa: How International and
National Law Handled Non-State Fighters in the 'Good Old Days' Before 1949 and
That Approach's Applicability to the 'War on Terror,' 24 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 549, 578
(2010).
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ability to prosecute detainees whose crimes originate from the fact that they en-
gaged in combat without wearing any uniforms.95 However, this reading ignores
the broad changes in international law concerning the treatment of non-uni-
formed fighters that have taken place since World War II.
After World War II, the Geneva Convention of 1949 and Additional Proto-
cols of 1977 expanded protections for non-uniformed fighters. Though the U.S.
military courts acquitted the Germans in the Hostages Trial for executing gueril-
las, the brutality of the Nazi treatment of partisans profoundly influenced the
drafters of the Geneva Convention.9* The Convention moved toward a greater
recognition of the validity of guerillas in warfare-in part by requiring that gue-
rilla fighters obey the rules of warfare, including wearing some type of insignia.97
The growth of non-international armed conflicts after World War II led to a fur-
ther change in the laws of armed conflict, as the United Nations increasingly rec-
ognized the legitimacy of resistance movements, which fought without uni-
forms.9' Accordingly, these non-uniformed combatants came to be seen as
soldiers who were also deserving of protections under the international laws of
war.
This gradual recognition of guerilla fighters culminated in the passage of the
Additional Protocols of 1977. In particular, Article 44 on Combatants and Pris-
oners of War states:
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the
effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a
military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that
there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the
hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall
retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he
carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged
in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which
he is to participate.99
95. See Lee Casey, David Rivkin, Jr. & Darin Bartman, Unlawful Belligerency and Its
Implications Under International Law, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY n.i5 (Feb. 15, 2005),
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/unlawful-belligerency-and-its-
implications-under-international-law.
96. Crawford, supra note 83, at 173.
97. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
98. Id.
99. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
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This protocol afforded much greater protection to guerilla fighters than had his-
torically been the case.' It was premised on the recognition that there were con-
flicts in which it might be expected that soldiers would operate without uniform
or insignia. The Protocol also established that while guerilla fighters may not be
entitled to the full range of protections afforded to uniformed combatants, par-
ticipating in hostilities without uniform is not in and of itself a war crime. As
George Fletcher, a scholar of the laws of war has noted, it is a "giant leap" to
reason from someone's failure to qualify as a lawful combatant that that person
is guilty of being an unlawful combatant.'0 '
Thus, the ability of guerilla fighters to participate in combat against an occu-
pying force is now recognized as deserving of some protection under interna-
tional law. It is no longer acceptable for soldiers such as the Francs-Tireurs to be
executed for fighting without a uniform. Thus, under a Hamdan II analysis, it
seems very unlikely that convictions against detainees that stem from their par-
ticipation in hostilities without a uniform would survive on appeal.
C. Risk of Retaliation and the Tu Quoque Defense
The fact that U.S. forces and intelligence operatives regularly engage in com-
bat without uniforms poses particular risks and legal hurdles with the murder in
violation of the law of war charge, which further highlights why it should not be
used by the military commissions.
At various points during the global war on terrorism, U.S. forces disguised
themselves in local garb to fight more effectively. In the early stages of the war,
fighting was led by "Army Delta and Special Forces soldiers, [who] wore civilian
clothing in the combat zone-jeans, tee shirt, and baseball cap; in Afghanistan,
they occasionally wore the flowing abah of local males."'o This practice emerged
in response to the Taliban's bounty for killing uniformed U.S. soldiers fighting
with the Northern Alliance. 0 3 To protect U.S. forces, the Pentagon allowed them
to operate with Northern Alliance fighters in local garb instead of wearing tradi-
tional U.S. military uniforms.0 4
Even after the initial invasion, U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan have con-
tinued to operate in civilian attire in certain regions to allow them to blend in
with the local population. This is particularly essential in remote areas where the
U.S. Army has only limited reach and uniformed U.S. troops would quickly be
ioo. See ALENA ANGELOVICOVA, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
LAWFUL AND UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS 14 (2007).
101. George Fletcher, The Law of War and Its Pathologies, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
517, 541 (2007).
102. GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
WAR 221 (2010).
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sighted.'o Moreover, when military forces have participated in humanitarian
missions, they have opted to wear civilian clothes, a practice that aid workers have
protested. o6 Similarly, the significant number of contractors who have fought
alongside U.S. forces have often failed to wear a uniform, and there is no military
supervision of this practice.o7 Private contractors did not always wear the Mas-
soud scarf that identified them as part of the Northern Alliance fighters; others
even concealed their weapons.os
The military defended its practice of deploying some forces in Afghanistan
without uniforms by appealing to the historical distinction between troops that
operated without uniforms and those that fought without uniforms. General Stan-
ley McChrystal argued, "[I]f a force is going to engage in combat, it's going to
fight, it must wear a uniform or some kind of uniform-law of land warfare says
arm bands or some distinctive marking that allows combatants to be identified
from civilians."o9 As per the military's framework, it is legal for forces to operate
without a uniform, but they had to put on some insignia before engaging in com-
bat. This legal distinction has roots in the Skorzeny precedent that came out of
World War II.no In the midst of the Battle of the Bulge, the Nazi army ordered a
group of soldiers to disguise themselves in U.S. uniforms and sneak behind U.S.
lines. The Nazi soldiers were commanded by Otto Skorzeny, and were tried for
perfidy after World War II. The court acquitted them because they only used the
disguise to move into position to launch an assault, rather than using the disguise
as part of an assault."'
However, the reality in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as future conflicts in
which the United States may engage, is that without clear lines of battle, it is un-
predictable when a unit may find itself involved in a hostile engagement. U.S.
forces wearing civilian clothes may not actively seek out combat operations, but
105. Carmen Gentille, In Afghanistan, Special Units Do the Dirty Work, USA TODAY, Nov.
1, 2on, http://usatoday3o.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/story/211-11-o9/
special-forces-key-in-afghanistan/5114569o/1.
106. See Ted van Baarda & Larry Minear, Military Haberdashery in Afghanistan, 16
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they do regularly engage in combat while in civilian dress because of the unpre-
dictability of warfare." Consequently, even though U.S. forces may be abiding
by the Skorzeny precedent in wearing civilian clothes, these forces have nonethe-
less regularly engaged in combat while in nonstandard uniforms. 3 Yet with the
exact nature of many of these engagements classified, there is no way to ascertain
to what degree U.S. Special Forces utilize uniforms or insignia even during the
combat phase of their operations.
As such, prosecuting enemy combatants for charges such as murder in vio-
lation of the law of war, which rest on failing to wear a uniform, creates two major
problems: First, it jeopardizes U.S. forces and, second, it empowers a tu quoque
defense, which further endangers the prosecution's case.
First, these prosecutions set a troubling precedent and create a serious risk
for U.S. forces operating without uniforms. If the United States builds a theory
of international law according to which a uniform is required for combatant im-
munity, then the United States is also building a legal case that can be used against
any captured American who lacks a uniform. This risk would certainly be present
in the current conflict, but it is unlikely that Taliban or al-Qaeda forces in Af-
ghanistan would provide any type of legal protection to U.S. forces, regardless of
whether they were uniformed or non-uniformed. The more acute risk posed by
this development is in unknown future conflicts. In future operations, the United
States will, once again, want to be able to use intelligence operatives and Special
Forces in nonstandard uniforms based on military necessity. The treatment of
those U.S. citizens if they are captured may hinge significantly on the legal norms
that the United States builds in its treatment of detainees charged for crimes hing-
ing on their lack of a uniform."4 While there is no guarantee that a future enemy
will treat captured U.S. citizens any better because the United States opted not to
advance a charge, such as murder in violation of the law of war, that is based on
lack of uniform, the United States will undoubtedly be in a better position to
vehemently object to the prosecution of non-uniformed U.S. forces for war
crimes if it has itself refrained from that practice.
Second, current U.S. practice empowers defendants charged with murder in
violation of the law of war to make a tu quoque defense. Latin for "you also," a tu
quoque defense rests on the accused turning the accusation back against the pros-
ecution. Admiral Karl Doenitz successfully utilized such a defense after World
War II. A German naval commander, Doenitz was accused of waging unre-
stricted submarine warfare in violation of the laws of war and failing to rescue
survivors of attacks."' Doenitz enlisted the assistance of U.S. Admiral Nimitz and
112. Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Forces Step Up Pakistan Presence, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBloool424o5274870472360457537913283869873
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113. Jelinek, supra note 109.
114. Parks, supra note 103, at 513.
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members of the British Admiralty to testify that this had also been their policy."6
The defense's claim was not that the United States had also violated international
law, but rather that neither the United States nor Doenitz had violated interna-
tional law because the common-place actions demonstrate that the law was not
widely obeyed. Nimitz stated, "I in no way wish to prove or even maintain that
the American admiralty in its U-boat warfare against Japan broke international
law. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that it acted strictly in accordance with
international law.""' While Doenitz was ultimately convicted of other charges,
the Nuremberg Tribunal accepted this argument and did not convict him for that
conduct."' The tu quoque defense was later enshrined in another German war
crimes trial, in which the court held that "no State may accuse another State of
violations of international law and exercise criminal jurisdiction over the latter's
citizens in respect of such violations if it is itself guilty of similar violations against
the other State or its allies.""'9
Based on these rulings, and the abundant available evidence of U.S. forces
wearing non-standard uniforms in Afghanistan, including during actual combat
operations, prosecuting detainees for uniform-based offenses such as murder in
violation of the law of war would strongly empower a tu quoque defense. The
defense counsel in the Khadr case raised this argument at trial, but a plea deal was
struck soon after and the issue was never fully litigated. 2 0 In a future case, the
defense could use the tu quoque argument in hopes of acquitting the detainee of
the relevant charges. Moreover, even if it did not succeed in doing so, litigating
the issue would prove highly embarrassing for the government-the defense
would have an opportunity to call in U.S. Special Forces and intelligence opera-
tives to testify about their use of nonstandard uniforms. Like Admiral Nimitz's
testimony at the Donitz trial, the testimony of U.S. operatives would be used to
determine whether or not to convict the defendant. In such a scenario, while the
prosecution would seek to draw distinctions between the non-standard uniforms
of U.S. soldiers and those of the Taliban, and showcase an attempt to adhere to
the Skorzeny distinction, the defense's argument would likely be powerful and
could significantly undermine the claims and credibility of the prosecution.
Thus, on both legal and strategic grounds, using the charge of murder in vi-
olation of the law of war to prosecute detainees at Guantanamo is misguided. As
illustrated by the above analysis, using this charge to prosecute detainees based
n6. Id.
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on their lack of uniform-as both Administrations have done-is untenable un-
der international law, as codified by the Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocol, and exposes U.S. forces to significant risk in future operations. Accord-
ingly, it should not serve as the basis for prosecution of detainees in military com-
missions.
IV. SPYING
The United States has also sought to use the charge of spying to prosecute
detainees in military commissions. When the United States has captured individ-
uals who conduct surveillance of United States military positions, they have
sought to charge them as spies. In the Khadr case, for instance, the United States
sought to prosecute the defendant for observing U.S. troops and then reporting
what he had witnessed back to Taliban fighters to help prepare for a strike, all
while Khadr was not wearing a uniform.m' The Department of Justice has con-
tinued to defend the legitimacy of the spying charge. In their brief for the en banc
appeal of the Al-Bahlul case, the DOJ argued that "spying has been treated as a
crime subject to trial by military tribunal." 2 2
While the Department of Justice has maintained that spying is a violation of
the law of war, and therefore meets the Hamdan II standard, this Part disputes
that view. It argues that spying without a uniform is not a violation of the tradi-
tional international laws of war and therefore should not be used to try detainees
captured in Afghanistan.
A. History of Spying in the Military Commissions
The charge of spying has deep roots in the military commissions, dating back
to the Revolutionary War. The first conviction of a spy by a military commission
took place during the Revolutionary War. Commander John Andr6 had signed
up with the British army in Canada and was sent by General Henry Clinton to
work with Benedict Arnold on a mission that required him to pass through en-
emy lines in a civilian disguise. During the mission, he wore a civilian coat over
his military garb, but was captured by American forces and eventually executed."
A board summoned by General George Washington convicted him of spying and
ordered that "agreeably to the laws and usages of nations he ought to suffer
death."'2
121. Savage, supra note 57.
122. Brief for Respondent at 30, 41, Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. July lo,
2013).
123. 3 EDWARD CUST, ANNALS OF THE WARS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 256 (1862)
("His change of dress was adduced as fatal to the character of a mere military
messenger, although it was only a great-coat over his half-uniform.").
124. David A. Anderson, Spying in Violation of Article io6, UCMJ: The Offense and the
Constitutionality of Its Mandatory Death Penalty, 127 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990).
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During the Civil War, the use of the spying charge grew increasingly fre-
quent. In 1862, Congress passed legislation specifying that, "in time of war or re-
bellion against the supreme authority of the United States, all persons who shall
be found lurking as spies, or acting as such, . .. shall suffer death by sentence of
a general court-martial."'2 5
Based on this legislation, the charge of spying became one of the most com-
mon crimes tried by a military commission during the Civil War. Reflecting on
the war, William Winthrop noted:
During the recent war the majority of the persons tried and convicted as
spies were officers or soldiers of the enemy's army, who, in penetrating
our lines, had abandoned their proper uniform for the dress of a civilian;
and it was held that such an officer or soldier, discovered thus disguised,
was in general to be treated, not as a prisoner of war, but as being prima
facie a spy."
Winthrop's description of the illicit conduct reveals an understanding of spying
that is rooted in the act of disguising oneself as a civilian and using this to attempt
to infiltrate enemy lines.
Other statements and decisions from the period further reveal the degree to
which these elements were essential to spying and characteristic of all prosecuted
cases during the war. In 1865, the Judge Advocate General issued a ruling that
stated:
[A]n officer or soldier of the rebel army [who] comes within our lines
disguised in the dress of a citizen is prima facie evidence of his being a
spy. The disguise, so assumed, strips him of all claim to be treated as a
prisoner of war. But such evidence may be rebutted by proof that he had
come within the lines to visit his family, and not for the purpose of ob-
taining information as a spy.'
General Sherman displayed a similar perspective in treating two captured caval-
rymen as spies because they were caught in civilian clothing. He noted:
These men have no uniform, no marks of a soldier's dress; are not even
dressed alike, and are clothed as citizens. We should not treat such men
as soldiers. We should insist on their soldiers wearing a uniform-some-
thing to distinguish them from the common citizen.1
The conviction of John Yates Beall by a prominent military commission during
the Civil War also stemmed from the fact that he was in civilian clothes when he
crossed into Ohio to conduct a sabotage raid. In coming to its conclusion, the
commission reasoned: "The accused was in citizen's dress, showing no insignia
125. Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 25, § 4,12 Stat. 340 (1862).
126. 1 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 767 (2d ed. 1920).
127. U.S. WAR DEP'T, DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE
ARMY 127.
128. U.S. WAR DEP'T, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARM IES (Ser. 1, Part 3) 226 (1890).
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of his rank or profession, embarking as an ordinary passenger, and representing
himself to be on a pleasure trip to Kelley's Island, in Lake Erie, within the juris-
diction of the State of Ohio."' 9
While the frequency of the use of the spying charge in the Civil War military
commissions seems to indicate that it has long been understood as a viable charge
under international law, a closer analysis reveals that these rulings from eight-
eenth- and nineteenth-century American history are not good precedent for the
current question of how to treat Guantanamo detainees. The kinds of charges
being contemplated against detainees accused of spying on U.S. forces in Afghan-
istan are significantly different from those used in the Revolutionary and Civil
Wars. The charge of spying as currently formulated is consequently untenable
under international law.
The charges during the Revolutionary and Civil Wars required two critical
elements: an attempt to cross enemy lines and an attempt to actively disguise
oneself. Neither of these elements is consistently present in the conflict in Af-
ghanistan.
The importance of the first of these elements is illustrated by Commander
Andre's case. His conviction hinged on his attempting to pass through American
lines. These earlier wars almost always featured clear lines of battle; that is no
longer is the case today. Recent conflicts, and certainly the war in Afghanistan,
have wholly abandoned that notion of fixed lines of opposing soldiers. Rather,
hostilities generally take place in a sporadic and unpredictable manner, with
boundaries between forces unclear and constantly shifting.c'o Accordingly, the
spying charge's historic requirement that the accused have attempted to infiltrate
enemy lines is essentially impossible in Afghanistan, where there are no clear U.S.
lines for spies to sneak across.
Moreover, the second requirement for spying, that the accused have at-
tempted to actively disguise himself, is also inapplicable in Afghanistan. Confed-
erate soldiers had a regular uniform. 3 ' Their convictions rested on the fact that
they had specifically chosen to abandon these uniforms and wear civilian cloth-
ing. Winthrop's summary of the Civil War military commissions highlighted the
importance of the fact that the individuals had "abandoned their proper uniform
for the dress of a civilian" for determining that the combatant was a spy. 32 Win-
throp provided an expanded definition of the concealment involved in spying,
which emphasized
129. U.S. WAR DEP'T, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES (Ser. 2, Vol. III) 280 (1899).
130. See generally MAx BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF
AMERICAN POWER (2002) (discussing the rise of "small wars" that are fought by
guerillas rather than by fixed units).
131. While Confederate soldiers may have lacked a regular uniform, some had uniforms
that marked them as combatants. See FRANCIS A. LORD, UNIFORMS OF THECIVILWAR
135 (1970).
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491
YALE LAW& POLICY REVIEW
[t]he concealment is in general contrived by his disguising himself by a
change of dress, by assuming the enemy's uniform, by coloring the hair,
removing the beard or wearing a false one, assuming a false name; as also
by false representations, by personating another individual, or by any
other false pretence or form of fraud.'33
The U.S. government cannot demonstrate that the type of conduct at issue in
Afghanistan meets this definition of spying because the "disguise" that individu-
als such as Khadr are accused of wearing is simply their everyday clothes. Com-
batants in Afghanistan have no "proper uniform," so in wearing civilian clothes
while conducting reconnaissance, they are not "chang[ing] dress" or actively at-
tempting to disguise themselves.134
Thus, while the spying is a traditional charge in the military commissions,
the charges being contemplated today are substantially different from those
brought in the Revolutionary and Civil Wars. The Afghan detainees have neither
snuck behind enemy lines nor employed a disguise, and therefore do not meet
either of the critical elements of the Revolutionary or Civil War prosecutions for
spying. In the case of Khadr, the government argued that "spies-like Khadr-
who conduct their activities clandestinely, without wearing a uniform, with the
sanction of a State, and under the guise of a civilian are triable by military com-
mission and are punishable up to and including death." 35 The government then
cited the history of military commission cases dating back to Commander An-
dre's case as the basis for these charges.136 Yet, examination of these spying prec-
edents has demonstrated that these earlier cases in fact cut against the govern-
ment's argument that spying is a viable charge for individuals captured in
Afghanistan.
B. Quirin, Spying, and International Law
The Supreme Court considered the propriety of charging spies under the
military commissions in Ex parte Quirin. The Supreme Court ruled in Quirin that
eight German saboteurs could be tried in military commissions because they en-
tered the United States without military uniforms and thus violated the laws of
war as spies. 37
The Court's decision in Quirin largely turned on the decision by the Germans
to bury their uniforms after they landed ashore in the United States. The Court
noted that " [w] hile landing they wore German Marine Infantry uniforms or parts
133. Id.
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of uniforms. Immediately after landing they buried their uniforms and the other
articles mentioned, and proceeded in civilian dress to New York City."' This act
of removing uniforms was critical in finding that the Germans should be treated
as unlawful combatants instead of lawful combatants entitled to prisoner of war
status. Elaborating on this distinction, the Court held that soldiers who "dis-
card[] their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving
destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable
as such by military commission." 39
While the court's holding does provide support for the view that spying is a
violation of the laws of war, it does not encompass the variety of activity the Ad-
ministration considers to be spying today. More crucially, the Quirin Court's in-
terpretation of international law was critically flawed. 40
The Court failed to articulate how the German saboteurs' spying was a vio-
lation of international law. The Quirin decision mistook the fact that the com-
batants were not protected under combatant immunity as itself a violation of in-
ternational law. The Hague Regulations of 1899 set forward the "Qualifications
of Belligerents" as:
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to
militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
To carry arms openly; and
To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war.141
Though the saboteurs failed to meet the second criterion because they lacked any
uniform or insignia, the Supreme Court misread the international law. George
Fletcher noted, "In one of the greatest legal fallacies I have ever encountered, the
Quirin court makes the giant leap from the status of failing to qualify as a lawful
combatant to the crime of being an unlawful combatant." 42 He compared this to
"reasoning from someone's driving a Chevrolet without a license to the liability
of General Motors for a violation of the criminal law."' 43 The Hague Regulations
did not criminalize the lack of insignia as itself a violation of international law;' 1
it was only the Court's reinterpretation that made this a cause to remove protec-
tions provided by the laws of war. Thus, the ability to remove the protections of
138. Id. at 21.
139. Id. at 35.
140. Fletcher, supra note io, at 541.
141. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its
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prisoner of war status from those who lack a uniform is not a recent invention;
"the idea of cracking POW immunity originates in Quirin."45
The military commissions have relied on Quirin to support charges of spy-
ing, but this use of precedent is misguided. In the case of Omar Khadr, the de-
fense argued that the military commissions lacked jurisdiction because spying is
not a violation of the laws of war, but Judge Peter Brownback rejected their
claim.146 Judge Brownback relied on the Quirin decision to rule that "[t]he con-
gressional decision to enact the spying provision was not a decision to create a
new crime and Congress did not create a new crime." 47 The judge went on to
clarify that "[slending out spies is not a violation of the law of war; however, a
captured spy maybe executed for the act of spying for violating the law of war."48
This argument, however, fails to address the basic point brought forward by the
defense-that the charge of spying itself cannot be a violation of the laws of war.
Just as in Hamdan II, in which the D.C. Circuit ruled that " [t]here is no interna-
tional-law proscription of material support for terrorism,"'49 there is no interna-
tional law basis against spying.
The Quirin Court erred in its interpretation of international law because
there is no international legal prohibition on spying. As we assess the question
today of whether spying is a violation of the laws of war, we should discard the
faulty conclusions in Quirin.
C. Scouts, Not Spies
The Uniform Code of Military Justice offers a helpful explanation of how to
distinguish the conduct of a spy from that of scouts, who have legally protected
status as combatants. It notes that "members of a military organization or civil-
ians" who are engaged in scouting mission are not spies and that a "person living
in occupied territory who, without lurking, or acting clandestinely or under false
pretense, merely reports what is seen or heard ... may not be charged under this
article as being a spy."' Winthrop himself categorized the act of "mere observing
of the enemy" as distinct from spying, and stated that it was a legally protected
element of war.''
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In using this framework to assess the charge sheet against accused spies, it
becomes clear that the type of activity the government sought to prosecute in
these cases was scouting, not spying. In Khadr's charge sheet, Charge V accuses
him of spying because he "conducted surveillance of U.S. forces and made nota-
tions as to the number and types of vehicles, distances between the vehicles, ap-
proximate speed of the convoy, [and] time and direction of the convoys."' Yet
this is exactly the kind of behavior that constitutes "observing the enemy," as per
Winthrop's description. It has none of the distinctive elements of spying, such as
crossing enemy lines or disguise. Of course, scouts may provide information use-
ful to their commanders, but that does not make them spies. In the Civil War,
General Robert E. Lee said that Major General Jeb Stuart, who commanded a
group of cavalry that would often deploy to the flank of the Union Army to gain
intelligence, "never brought me a piece of false information."'5 3 However, this
type of activity was what Winthrop would have termed "merely observing" and
did not make him a spy. While the information he provided to his commanders
was valuable, and certainly resulted in the death of Union troops, his conduct
was that of a scout, rather than a spy. Merely gaining valuable intelligence about
the enemy through observation is not enough to make one a spy. The other two
requirements must be met as well.
V. PROSECUTING CASES IN ARTICLE III COURTS
The Obama Administration is considering the continued use of the charges
of murder in violation of the law of war and spying to prosecute detainees in the
military commissions. Parts III and IV, respectively, have demonstrated that
these charges have little standing in international law and thus fail the Hamdan
II test. While the option to move detainees into Article III trial courts has high
political costs, particularly as Congress has attempted to prevent such action
through appropriations restrictions, we argue in this Part that this is the best
course of action. Rather than pursue these cases in the military commissions,
where they will likely be overturned at the appellate level, the government should
charge the detainees who were captured in Afghanistan in Article III courts. This
is especially urgent since the legal basis for the United States' power to detain
these individuals as enemy combatants under the laws of war may be coming to
an end in 2014.
A. Available Alternative Options
The foregoing analysis of the military commissions' ability to charge detain-
ees for murder in violation of the law of war and spying has revealed that any
such prosecutions would likely be overturned. Given that the United States' legal
152. Khadr Charge Sheet, supra note 6o.
153. Intelligence in the Civil War, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 14, https://www.cia
.gov/library/publications/additional-publications/civil-war/Intel inthe CW.pdf.
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authority to detain individuals without charge under the laws of war is soon ex-
piring (and assuming that the government is unwilling to release these detainees),
it is left with only a few justifications for continued detention, all of which are
dubious under domestic and international law.
One option that could make continued detention more tenable under do-
mestic law is for the President to rely on his Article II commander-in-chief au-
thority. The Bush Administration adopted this view following the September iith
attacks. It argued that the President's power to detain combatants stemmed di-
rectly from his authority as commander-in-chief and did not depend on any stat-
utory authorization conferred by the AUMF.'54 Yet this position was widely crit-
icized by legal commentators and academics.' 5 The general consensus is that,
while the President does have some independent authority to use military force
in certain instances, the President usually shares war powers with Congress. Con-
sequently, the President also shares detention authority.15' The Article Il-derived
detention authority argument has come to be associated with the excesses of the
Bush Administration. Any attempt by the President to justify indefinite detention
separate from the AUMF's grant of authority would be not only highly unlikely
and legally suspect, but also politically toxic. Accordingly, President Obama has
explicitly rejected the argument that his use of military force derives from Article
II powers, maintaining that his powers derive from the 2001 AUMF passed by
Congress.' 7
An alternative is for the President to seek a new AUMF. Such an AUMF could
be better tailored to counter new kinds of terrorist threats, such as smaller off-
shoot groups, and could provide authority to continue targeted military opera-
tions against these entities.5'8 This option, however, presents two problems. First,
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Cir. 2002) (No. 02-6895).
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under international law, the authority to detain an enemy belligerent lasts only
as long as it is necessary, or while there exists a risk that the individual will take
up arms and re-join hostile forces.' 9 Even if a new AUMF authorized detention
under the law of war for newly captured combatants, it would be difficult to show
that current detainees, who were picked up on the battlefield in Afghanistan, con-
tinue to pose a risk of joining enemy forces given that the new enemy forces may
be smaller radical groups in Africa.160 Accordingly, even under a new AUMF,
continuing to hold captured Afghan detainees after 2014 would violate interna-
tional law. A new AUMF cannot justify continued detention without charge for
individuals picked up as part of an earlier conflict.
Secondly, even if this option were legally viable, the current level of political
dysfunction in Congress makes it highly unlikely that it would be able to agree
on and pass a new AUMF to address emerging threats. And, even if Congress
managed to pass a new authorization, it is very unlikely to be effective and adeptly
tailored. Bearing in mind these difficulties, President Obama has voiced an inter-
est in refining the current AUMF before eventually repealing it, rather than trying
to pass any new legislation to counter terrorism through Congress.''
Thus, with the impending withdrawal from Afghanistan, it seems unlikely
that either the President's Article II powers or a new AUMF will authorize con-
tinued detention of the individuals captured in Afghanistan under international
or domestic law. Assuming that releasing these individuals would pose a security
threat, prosecuting these detainees is the only way forward.
B. Advantages of Federal Courts
While prosecution is necessary, as discussed in Parts III and IV, these indi-
viduals should not be tried in military commissions; the uniform-based crimes
that the government is charging, murder in violation of the law of war and spying,
are untenable under international law and are consequently likely to be over-
turned on appeal. The best option to reduce the population of Guantanamo de-
tainees is therefore to try detainees in Article III courts. Several critical reasons
make this approach the correct one to reducing the population of Guantanamo
159. See Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 132, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 ("Each interned person
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detainees held under the laws of war: the legitimacy of federal courts, their track
record of success, and, most fundamentally, their ability to try these detainees
with crimes under domestic law.
Federal courts are the foundation of the American judicial system and are
well-respected both domestically and internationally as fair arbiters. Military
commissions also have a historical role in the American system of justice, but
they have in many ways become tainted since 2001.62 It is true that the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 ushered in significant reforms, and the military com-
missions re-started since 2010 are dramatically different from those of the early
years of the Bush Administration.163
Yet it is difficult to counter the argument that the use of military commis-
sions in the war on terror has become indelibly tainted by the Bush Administra-
tion. For years, they lacked sufficient procedural safeguards under constitu-
tional'6 4 and international law' and were considered to be largely illegitimate
162. See David Cole, Military Commissions and the Paradigm of Prevention, in
GUANTANAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL COURTS AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN
POLICY PERSPECTIVES 95 (Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aolian eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2013) (discussing the criticisms of the military commissions); William
Glaberson, Obama to Keep Tribunals; Stance Angers Some Backers, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 20o9, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/o5/16/us/politics/16gitmo.html (quoting
the Human Rights First executive director as maintaining, "Tinkering with the
machinery of military commissions will not remove the taint of GuantAnamo from
future prosecutions").
163. There are protections in place to ensure that prisoners receive due process and these
procedures have benefited from hindsight and years of court opinions. For instance,
evidence obtained through "coerced testimony" is inadmissible; defendants have
the right to cross-examine witnesses, view all evidence to be used against them, and
call their own witnesses in support; defendants must be provided with adequate
counsel; and there are limitations on the admissibility of hearsay testimony. See Josh
Gerstein, Obama Signs Military Commissions Reforms, POLITICO, Oct. 28, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/hoo9/Obama-signs-Military-commis
sionsreforms.html; Legal System Comparison, OFFICE OF MILITARY COMM'N,
http://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS/LegalSystemComparison.aspx (last visited Mar. 23,
2014).
164. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (20o8); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006).
165. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629-635 (discussing the commissions' lack of compliance
with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions).
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and rebuked by human rights groups,' individuals involved in the commis-
sions,'6 7 and the Supreme Court."' Despite the reforms instituted by the Obama
Administration, and the appointment of highly-respected General Mark Martins
as Chief Prosecutor, it is difficult for the commissions to overcome the reputa-
tional harm suffered for almost a decade. It therefore would be more useful for
the United States to try detainees in Article III courts in order to begin to restore
our moral standing in the eyes of both allies and enemies. This is also advanta-
geous from a strategic perspective; trying detainees in Article III courts would
undercut the recruiting narrative of terrorist groups who for years have pointed
to Guantanamo and its affiliated commissions as a symbol of U.S. hypocrisy.' 9
Article III courts are widely perceived as legitimate, due to the many procedural
protections in place,' and using them to try detainees would ensure that these
prosecutions do not become a similar symbol.
Moreover, the history of successful terrorism prosecutions by Article III
courts in many ways stands in contrast to the commissions' track record. The
conviction rate for terrorism-related cases in federal courts is estimated to be
close to 91 percent,"' and the sentences have generally been much longer than
have those coming from commissions' convictions. 7 While some have claimed
166. See, e.g., Revisions Can't Fix Military Commissions, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (July 8,
2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/o7/o8/us-revisions-can-t-fix-military
-commissions ("The discredited military commissions should have been
abandoned long ago.").
167. See Legal Issues Surrounding the Military Commissions System: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Const., Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, iith Cong. 19-20 (2009) (testimony of Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld)
(describing the commissions as "broken beyond repair" and arguing that they
"cannot be fixed").
168. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557.
169. See, e.g., Paul Harris, Guantanamo 'Not in the Best Interests of the American People,'
Says Obama, GUARDIAN, Apr. 30, 2013, http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/3o/obama-guantanamo-hunger-strike-worsens;
Therese Postel, How Guantanamo Bay's Existence Helps Al-Qaeda Recruit More
Terrorists, ATLANTIC, Apr. 12, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2013/04/how-guantanamo-bays-existence-helps-al-qaeda
-recruit-more-terrorists/274956.
170. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL4o832, COMPARISON OF RIGHTS IN
MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT (2010).
171. Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit ofJustice: Prosecuting Terrorism
Cases in Federal Courts, HUM. RTs. FIRST (2008), http://www.humanrightsfirst
.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/o80521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf.
172. Salim Hamdan, for instance, was sentenced to 66 months imprisonment, of which
61 months the judge was planning to credit as time served, despite the prosecution's
efforts to get 30 years to life imprisonment. William Glaberson, Bin Laden Driver
Sentenced to a Short Term, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 20o8, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/
o8/o8/washington/o8gitmo.html. David Hicks received 9 months imprisonment in
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that the rules of procedure and evidence applicable in civilian trials cannot han-
dle the sensitive national security information at stake in these cases and fail to
take into account the realities of detention in an active conflict zone,'73 these ar-
guments are incorrect. Courts have developed careful procedures for precisely
such situations, and have been remarkably successful at convicting terrorism sus-
pects who are tried in their jurisdictions for an array of offenses. 17 4
With respect to the objection about rules of procedure and evidence, the
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) creates a system of procedures
that allows judges to conduct in camera review to determine if classified evidence
needs to be disclosed to the defense.75 These procedures have been used effec-
tively in a number of cases in which the government possessed evidence bearing
on the defendant's guilt, but which could have been detrimental to national se-
curity concerns if made public.7' Leaks stemming from these classified proce-
dures are incredibly rare, and through CIPA, "courts have proved, again and
again, that they are up to the task of balancing the defendant's right to a fair trial,
the government's desire to offer relevant evidence, and the imperative of protect-
ing national security."' Article III courts are fully equipped to handle the sensi-
tive national security information that would be at issue in trials involving Af-
ghan detainees.
Moreover, the argument that evidentiary standards in federal courts are pro-
hibitive for these cases is also misplaced. While it is true that military commis-
sions allow for the admission of some kinds of hearsay, whereas civilian courts
generally do not, flexibility is built into the Federal Rules of Evidence. In fact,
studies have suggested that in no terrorism case has "an important piece of evi-
dence [I been excluded on authentication or other grounds." 8 Courts have also
been able to admit evidence against terrorism suspects, even when those suspects
may have been detained and subject to harsh treatment before their trial. For
Australia, pursuant to a plea deal. Jackie Northam, Judge Cuts Hicks' Sentence from
7 Years to 9 Months, NPR, Mar. 30, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=9248761.
173. Republican members of Congress have consistently attacked the idea of civilian
courts as a forum in terrorism cases. See John Parkinson & Mary Bruce, Republicans
Decry Obama's Decision to Try Al Qaeda Suspect in Civilian Court, ABC NEWS, Mar.
8, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2ol3/03/republicans-decry-obamas
-decision-to -try-al-qaeda-suspects-in-civilian-court.
174. Oona Hathaway et al., The Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After
9/11, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 123, 173 (2013).
175. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2012); see EDWARD C. LIU & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41742, PROTECTING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND THE RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS: THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT (2012).
176. Hathaway et al., supra note 174, at 173.
177. See Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 171, at 8.
178. Id. at lo. See Hathaway et. al., supra note 174, at 176.
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instance, in a 2005 case, United States v. Abu Ali, a court concluded that inculpa-
tory statements made to Saudi Arabian interrogators while the defendant was de-
tained were voluntary and admissible in light of the situation.'79 Thus, through
procedural creativity, federal courts have proven themselves to be adept at han-
dling complex national security cases and have a history of successful convic-
tions."'
Beyond these general reasons in favor of using Article III courts instead of
military commissions to try terrorism cases, there is a special advantage of doing
so for Guantanamo detainees who have been held without charge under the laws
of war. The government is unable to charge many of these individuals with war
crimes. Though the goverment may possess intelligence linking the detainees to
terrorist activities, the individuals may not have directly participated in the prep-
aration or carrying out of discrete attacks or the evidence linking them to such
attacks may be too tenuous. In these situations, charges such as "material support
for terrorism" and "conspiracy to commit terrorism" are highly useful for pros-
ecutors. These charges are much easier to prove at trial and encompass a much
broader range of conduct. Material support for terrorism includes providing
"training, expert advice or assistance, service and personnel" to terrorist
groups.'"' Critically, the defendant's acts need not be tied to any particular ter-
rorist attacks-rather, the defendant can be convicted by demonstrating that he
or she acted to support a terrorist group in a multitude of different ways. Simi-
larly, conspiracy to commit terrorism is another powerful charge the government
can use to convict individuals who cannot be directly tied to an attack.'
These charges are wholly valid under domestic law and can be brought in
Article III courts. Moreover, the statutes criminalizing conduct constituting ma-
terial support or conspiracy to commit terrorism date back to the mid-1990s.
Congress enacted these provisions as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994183 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996.184 While the statutes have undergone several modifications since their
original enactment, prosecutions in federal courts for these charges do not raise
any ex post facto concerns.'
179. 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 373 (E.D. Va. 2005); see United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 112
(2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the trial court's admission into evidence of materials
seized from defendant that considered "the desirability of attacking enemies of
Islam" and "how to produce and use explosives").
180. See Benjamin & Zabel, supra note 171, at 26 fig.7 (noting that 90.625 percent of
terrorism cases have resulted in some kind of a conviction).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 2339a(b)(1) (2012).
182. Id. § 2332b(a)(2).
183. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 1o8 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 13701 (20o6)).
184. Pub. L. No. 104-132, no Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
185. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41333, TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT: AN
OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 2339B, at 1-2 (2010).
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Thus, these cases should be tried in Article III courts instead of military com-
missions, because the charges of material support for terrorism and conspiracy
are wholly permissible in federal courts, unlike in the commissions. This Note
has demonstrated that spying and murder in violation of the law of war will not
satisfy the Hamdan II for trying cases in the military commissions. Instead, the
government should turn to alternative charges that are available within the Arti-
cle III system.
C. Bringing Article III Courts to Guantanamo
Though congressional restrictions on the use of appropriated funds to trans-
fer Guantanamo detainees seem to make trying these individuals in Article III
courts infeasible, bringing the courts to Guantanamo could be a way to get
around this. In 2009, after the President and Attorney General Eric Holder an-
nounced their decision to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his co-conspirators
in federal court in Manhattan, a firestorm broke out, and the Administration was
ultimately forced to abandon the plan because of "bipartisan opposition."' In
the wake of this, Congress included in the National Defense Authorization Act
for 2011 a provision stating that no authorized funds were to be used for the trans-
fer of detainees at the Guantanamo Bay prison, either to the United States or to
other countries to be repatriated.8 7 This restriction has remained in place every
year since, and, despite President Obama's signing statements insisting that he
can disregard this restriction if it interferes with his commander-in-chief powers,
it has effectively blocked any attempts by the Administration to bring the detain-
ees to the United States for trial in federal court."'
An alternative option exists to try the Guantanamo detainees in Article III
courts despite congressional restrictions on their transfer: trying them in an Ar-
ticle III court in Guantanamo. While this proposal is unconventional, several
Congressmen have recently proposed it as a potential option.'" A closer look re-
veals that is in fact plausible. The jurisdiction of federal district courts can be
amended by statute, within certain constitutional boundaries. Congress could
186. Anne E. Korblut & Peter Finn, Obama Advisers Set to Recommend Military Tribuanls
for Alleged 9/n Plotters, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/O3/o4/AR2oloo3o4052O9.html.
187. Josh Gerstein, Obama Signs Defense Bill That Could Cripple His Guantanamo Policy,
POLITICO, Jan. 7, 2011, http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/oi/Obama
signs-defensebiHthat could-cripple hisGuantanamo-policy.html.
188. Charlie Savage, Obama Disputes Limits on Detainee Transfers Imposed in Defense Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/o1/o4/us/politics/obama
-signs-defense-bill-with-conditions.html.
189. Miranda Green, Try Gitmo Prisoners at Gitmo, Recommend Four Virginia
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amend the territorial jurisdiction of, for instance, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, to include Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Such an ap-
proach has, in fact, already been used to extend jurisdiction to other islands, in-
cluding Midway Atoll, Wake Island, Johnston Island and Kingman Reef'o By
statute, each of these are characterized as falling within the jurisdiction of federal
district courts.'9 ' Extending jurisdiction of a federal district court to cover Guan-
tanamo similarly would not only give it the authority to hear cases arising out of
Guantanamo but would also provide authority for the court to hold trials there.
While the costs of flying down jurors, assembling courtrooms, and coordi-
nating logistics would be significant, they are far smaller than the costs of ade-
quately securing a high-profile courthouse in the middle of downtown Manhat-
tan. Moreover, holding a trial in Guantanamo would enable the Administration
to get around the congressional restriction on funds, which concerns only the
transfer of detainees.'92 Perhaps even more fundamentally, it would nullify the
arguments that congressional members often make against trying detainees in
federal courts-namely, that it would be costly, endanger public safety, and be-
come a media spectacle.'93 By holding the trials in Guantanamo, the cost would
be far smaller, there would be no extra risk to homeland security, and the public
backlash that followed the announcement about Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's
trial would be avoided.'94 Thus, given that the best option to successfully prose-
cute the detainees captured in Afghanistan is in Article III courts, this proposal
could be a way to get around congressional restrictions and ensure that these de-
tainees face justice despite the difficult political realities.
CONCLUSION
The Obama Administration will soon be forced to either prosecute combat-
ants captured in Afghanistan or release them. As the President contemplates
whether to bring charges of murder in violation of the law of war and spying
190. Eugene R. Sullivan & Louis J. Freeh, Try Sept. 11 Suspects in the U.S. District Court
for Guantanamo, WASH. POST, July 16, 20o, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
-dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR2100715O4177.html.
191. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 644(a) (2012).
192. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1033-
34, 127 Stat. 672, 850-51.
193. Al Baker, Security for Terrorism Trials Estimated at $2oo Million a Year, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 20o, http://www.nytimes.com/2o1o/ol/o7/nyregion/o7terror.html?ref=
khalidshaikhmohammed; Michael Barbaro & Al Baker, Bloomberg Balks at9/11 Trial,
Dealing Blow to White House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/01/28/nyregion/28bloomberg.html?ref=khalidshaikhmohammed.
194. See New York Politicians Call for 9/11 Trial to Be Moved, GUARDIAN, Jan. 29, 2010,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2oo/an/29/september-ni-trial-new-york;
Politicians Rip Decision on Terrorism Trials, CNN, Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.cnn
.com/2009/POLITICS/11/13/mohammed.critics.
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against the non-uniformed combatants captured in Afghanistan, this Note pro-
vides an important analysis. We argue that these charges are not violations of the
laws of war and should not be brought in military commissions. Under Hamdan
II, they will likely be reversed on appeal. Rather than trying detainees in military
commissions, we argue that the Administration should instead transfer them to
Article III courts, where other advantageous charges are available to prosecutors.
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